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REPORT 
Number 26-September 1978 
Property Tax Assessment: 
A Century-Long Struggle For Structured Discretion 
by 
Teresa Olcott Cohea* 
"Broad discretion and judgment 
lie at the very core of the property tax." 
For the past 100 years, the history of property tax 
assessment in Montana has been a series of legislative and 
administrative efforts to limit and structure county 
assessors' discretion. The history of these efforts, which 
included legislation, constitutional amendments, court 
decisions, and administrative rule-making, is instructive 
since it provides a well-documented case study of how a vital 
state function involving great discretion can be made 
predictable and open to citizens. 
Property tax assessment is an excellent subject for 
studying discretion, since it requires assessors to make 
complex decisions on the characteristics and comparability 
of widely varying types of property. The Montana Supreme 
Court has consistently recognized the need for judgment and 
expertise in assessment and has been hesitant to substitute its 
judgment for that of an assessor: 
(the) court will ordinarily not interfere with the action of ... 
(assessors) to correct mere errors of judgment. It is only when they act 
fraudulently or maliciously, or the error or mistake is so gross as to ?e 
inconsistent with any exercise of honest judgment, that courts will 
grant relief. 
(Danforth v. Livingston, 23 Mont. 558, 59P.916,917 (1900) 
The legislature must rely on the expertise and judgment of 
assessors since the procedure for assessing every type of 
property in the state can hardly be written into statute, even 
if legislators or their draftsmen had the expertise to do so: 
new varieties of property appear, values rise, and complex 
formulas for depreciation must be developed. Moreover, 
assessors can determine the best method of assessing 
property on a case-by-case basis, which the legislature can-
not do through statute. Clearly, assessors must have some 
degree of discretion in order to perform their duties. 
However, far too much discretion can be delegated to or 
seized by assessors. If clear legislative standards and 
administrative procedures guide assessors' work, then their 
discretion may be limited to a ministerial or non-policy level 
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designed to implement legislative policies. In Montana, 
however, clear standards and procedures were absent or 
ignored for most of the last century and .assessors exercised 
discretionary authority of the highest order, making policy 
decisions of a most sensitive nature. Their discretionary 
authority at times surpassed that wielded by the legislature. 
The importance of structuring such discretion is obvious. 
Assessors determine the appraised or assessed value to which 
the statutory tax rates and the locally determined mill levies 
are applied. Their decisions touch all property-owning 
citizens and have a direct economic effect on their lives. If 
their decisions are based on unwritten standards that are in 
direct conflict with state law and, further, their assessments 
are often lowered on a case-by-case basis by individual 
taxpayers' pressure, citizens are unprotected by U.S. 
constitutional requirements of due process and equal 
protection and Montana constitutional requirements for 
uniform assessment of property. Moreover, assessors could 
and did for decades exercise political power far exceeding 
their scope of authority. Since local governments are 
financed largely through property taxation and the assessor 
controls the base from which this revenue is raised, he can 
exercise budgetary power statutorily given to county, city, 
and school district officers: 
After a unit of government has reached its maximum levy limitation, its 
future budgetary policy is largely in the hands of the assessor. The 
decision made in his office as to the percentage of market value that will 
be used for assessment purposes is almost controlling. Moreover, 
decisions made by the assessor are more apt to be influenced by 
consideration of his political future than by the legitimate revenue 
needs of local government. Thus we have the spectacle of the county 
assessor, whose sole function is to find and value property at its full 
value, charting the fiscal policy of most local governments. (Montana 
Legislative Council, Property Taxation in Montana, 1960, p. 31) 
The legislature's struggles to limit and structure assessors' 
discretion are not over, but its efforts over the past seventy 
years have insured that 1) detailed procedures for assessment 
are published in the Montana Administrative Code; 2) that 
these procedures comply with legislative standards; and 3) 
formalized procedures for citizens' participation in rule-
making and opportunities for appeals against assessments 
exist. This paper will discuss the steps- and mis-steps-in the 
process of obtaining the right mixture of statute, rule, and 
discretion. 
Between 1891 and 1977, Montana statute required that 
"all taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value," 
which was defined as "the amount at which the property 
would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor" (84-401and84-101, R.C.M. 1947). This statute was 
never, in its 74 year tenure, adhered to. County assessors 
and, later, the State Board of Equalization evolved a system 
of fractional assessment under which all property in the state 
was assessed at some fraction of full cash value. As recently 
as 1977, MAC rules required assessors to value business 
inventories at 60% of dealer's cost, oil field machinery at 40% 
of current market value, and airplanes at 66 2/ 3% of 
wholesale value. This system of fractional assessment totally 
disrupted legislative tax rates, drastically reduced local 
governments' tax bases, and caused massive shifts in tax 
burden. 
This system of fractional assessment did not, in my 
opinion, arise because the statutes were unnecessarily vague, 
delegating authority without meaningful standards. The 
legislature provided a standard for assessing ("full cash 
value") and a definition of that standard. Statutes did not 
specify methods for assessment but left that to assessors, 
who would use their expertise and discretion to establish the 
best methods of determining full cash value. Most state 
legislatures and courts have concurred that such judgements 
are an appropriate area for assessors' discretion. The 
continued violation of the statute requiring assessment at 
full cash value resulted not from careless delegation of 
authority but from the structure of tax administration 
established by the 1889 constitution. 
Article XVI, section 5 created the office of assessor in each 
county and provided for his local election. Statutes 
implementing the section required him to find and assess all 
taxable property in his county at "full cash value" (84-401 
and 84-406). However, the necessity of getting elected every 
four years provided .a strong temptation for assessors to 
ignore this statute, particularly in view of the history of 
county independence and the travelling distance from 
Helena in the early days of statehood. The rewards for 
underassessment were many: 1) taxpayers receiving an 
individual "break'' on an assessment would be grateful; 2) 
keeping assessments low would insure that statewide mills 
raised the least possible revenue in that county and shifted 
the tax burden to some other county; and 3) by lowering 
assessments assessors would force city and county com-
missioners to raise mill levies in order to raise the same 
amount of revenue, thus pushing the political liability of 
taxes into their laps. Assessors would have been less than 
human if they had not yielded to these pressures, since 
taxpayers' hostility toward taxes usually settles, unfairly and 
illogically, on assessors. 
The legislature discovered how strong the temptation had 
been when it appointed a Tax and License Commission in 
1917 to determine why property assessments varied so 
markedly from county to county. The Commission found 
that the following average rates of assessment were 
prevailing in the counties: land- 30% of full value; cattle- 45% 
of full value; sheep-40% of full value; horses and mules-52% 
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of full value; and hogs- 18% of full value. The only property 
assessed at the statutory level was the money belonging to 
widows and orphans, which was revealed by court records. 
Further, the Commission learned that these rates were set in 
an annual meeting of county assessors who "resolved 
themselves into a sort of legislative assembly and proceeded 
to fix the values at which different species of property shall 
be assessed." 
Needless to say, these fractional assessments were in direct 
conflict with statute and assessors were far exceeding their 
statutory authority in setting such rates. What's more, this 
extralegal "legislature" did not have much more success in 
controlling its members than the legitimate legislature. 
During the year between meetings, the assessors vied among 
themselves for the most "competitive" assessments. The 
Commission found in 1918 that assessments in different 
counties for first class grain land ranged from $5.21 ro $47.29 
per acre, first class hay land from $10 to $26.62 per acre, 
work horses from $49 to $75.65, and dairy cows from $33.92 
to $100. 
After reviewing the gap between statute and practice, the 
Commission concluded "that the present system . .. is a 
failure and results in unjust discrimination and is utterly 
inadequate." Believing that legislative control over assess-
ment must be reasserted, the Commission recommended a 
bill to the 1919 legislature that continued the assessment of 
property at full cash value but dropped the tax rate to the 
value county assessors were actually using for the various 
types of property. To illustrate, the tax on a $1000 parcel of 
land is calculated below according to the statutory method, 
the method actually used by assessors in 1917, and the 
proposed method: 
Statutory method 
I. Valued at 100% 
2. Taxed at 100% 
3. Multiplied by mills 
4. Tax due = $200 
($ IOOOx l00%x 
100%x200m) 
Actual practice, 1917 
I. Valued at 30% 
2. Taxed at 100% 
3. Multiplied by mills 




I. Valued at 100% 
2. Taxed at 30% 
3. Multiplied by mills 
4. Tax due = $60 
($1OOOx100%x 
30%x200m) 
The bill passed, creating seven classes of property taxed at 
rates varying from 7% to 100% of the assessed value, which 
was 100% of full cash value. The legislature, thus, in 1919 
clearly recognized the dangers of allowing assessors the 
discretion to set effective tax rates through extralegal 
fractional assessments. It hoped to end this practice by 
setting in statute both the standard of assessment and the tax 
rate. In upholding the constitutionality of the new law, the 
Montana Supreme Court noted that the chief purpose of the 
bill was "to relieve administrative officers from the apparent 
necessity of continuing the legal fiction of full valuation in 
the face of contrary facts ." The court also affirmed in this 
case that it was the legislature's duty to provide a uniform 
system of assessment throughout the state. (Hilger v. Moore, 
56 Mont. 146, 82 P. 477, 483 (1919)). 
This was the first of several times in which the legislature 
sought to control assessors by enacting their practice into 
law. One could argue that the legislature, in having 
legislation follow practice, was benefitting from the "creative 
nibbling" theory of administrative law: the legislature had 
given assessors sufficient discretion to investigate and chart a 
new course, allowing them to create a solution to a large 
problem by nibbling at individual cases. However, this was 
not true in Montana's history of property tax assessment. 
Assessors were not experimenting with the best way to 
assess; rather, they were substituting their judgment for 
legislators' on what the state's tax policies should be. The 
legislature modelled statute on existing practice in this 
instance only as an attempt to control future practice. 
The legislature also took another step toward controlling 
assessors at this time. The 1889 constitution created a three-
member State Board of Equalization to "adjust and equalize 
the valuation of the taxable property among the several 
counties of the state." However, when the Board attempted 
to raise assessments in one county to nearer the statutory full 
cash value, the Supreme Court ruled that the Board had the 
power to decrease assessments but not to increase them. The 
1916 legislature placed a constitutional amendment on the 
ballot to give the Board much broader power: 
The state board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation 
of taxable property among the several counties, and the different 
classes of taxable property in any county and in the several counties 
and between individual taxpayers; supervise and review the acts of the 
county assessors and the county boards of equalization; and exercise 
such authority and do all things necessary to secure a fair, just, and 
equitable valuation of all taxable property among counties, between 
classes of property, and between individual taxpayers. (Article XII, 
section 15) 
The electorate approved the amendment, which became 
effective in 1917. In 1923, the legislature passed a bill 
detailing and further broadening the Board's powers. 
Notably, the Board was empowered "to prescribe rules and 
regulations, not in conflict with the constitution and laws of 
Montana, to govern county boards of equalization and the 
assessors of the different counties in the performance of their 
duties." Further, it could require the county attorney to start 
proceedings against any assessor who violated statutory 
assessment laws. The bill also established hearing 
procedures for taxpayers' appeals against assessments and 
for Board changes in assessment rules. (84-708) 
Seemingly, the legislature in 1923 had gained control over 
assessment by requiring assessors to exercise ministerial 
level discretion within standards set by the legislature and 
reviewed by the State Board of Equalization, which 
exercised broad delegated quasi-legislative a~d quasi-
judicial authority within its area of expertise. However, 
neither the statutory changes embodied in the 1919 
classification law nor the 1917 constitutional amendment 
touched the fundamental problem of tax assessment: county 
assessors were still elected by local citizens and in direct 
contact with them. The three-mel(lber Board and its small 
staff were totally inadequate-and probably quite unwilling-
to police 56 county assessors. The Board limited itself to 
hearing individual taxpayers' appeals from county equaliza-
tion boards and lowering the assessment of whole classes of 
property when one county varied too markedly from others. 
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U.S. census data showed that assessors continued to drift 
away from full cash value throughout the next decade, 
despite admonitions from the Attorney General and the 
Montana Supreme Court. In 1931, the court in State ex. rel. 
Schoonover v. Stewart reiterated that statute requires that 
"all taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value. 
The section has not been change.ct since its enactment ... ; 
and its mandate is the law today." Neither assessors nor the 
Board had the power, the court said, to establish fractional 
assessment. 
The 1930's were, however, not a politic time to raise 
assessments, particularly on farm land. As the Depression 
deepened and more property taxes became delinquent, 
assessments fell further and further from full cash value. By 
1950, the average market value of an acre of irrigated farm 
land in Montana was $99, but its average assessed value was 
$32, less than it had been in 1921. 
The State Board of Equalization expressed great concern 
over these falling assessments and county assessors' neglect 
of statute. In 1954, they informed the legislature that the 
classification law 
is necessarily anchored to the full cash value provisions of section 84-
401, and when we deliberately cut loose from that anchor we begin to 
drift. The administration of the law has so deteriorated over the years 
that we now have ... a classification Jaw within a classification Jaw. 
(Sixteenth Biennial Report) 
However, the Board did not use its statutory authority to 
correct the situation. Although the legislature had given it 
power to adopt all necessary rules to govern assessors, the 
Board issued no body of rules to guide assessors between 
1923 and 1962. The Board did, with the assistance of the 
assessors' professional association, compile assessment 
guides and valuation schedules for various property and 
distribute them to assessors, but it did not make their use 
mandatory. Nor did the Board ever during these 40 years use 
its power to begin proceedings against a county assessor who 
violated state law by assessing at less than full cash value. In 
fact, the Board itself violated this law by lowering 
assessments to bring them down to the statewide average. 
Even when the legislature passed a Reclassification and 
Reappraisal Act in 1957 to bring residential property 
assessments to full value, the Board and assessors deter-
mined what fraction of this new value would be used. A 
legislative committee called this action "entirely unaccep-
table" and "beyond the power of the legislature to give the 
State Board of Equalization the arbitrary power to require 
(fractional assessment)," but it was uncertain how to correct 
the situation. The committee finally decided that the only 
way to control assessment was to establish fractional 
assessment by statute. Members argued that legislators 
would at least be aware of and consider what fraction of full 
value was to be used under this system. However, the 
subcommittee's proposed bill did not pass. 
By 1960, the county assessors and the State Board of 
Equalization had totally usurped legislative control over 
assessment. The Board's annual meeting with assessors-
established by statute as a training session the Board held for 
assessors-continued as a "legislature" in which tax policy 
was set. The Board and assessors became local government 
"budget watchers," who felt it was their duty to limit the 
amount of tax cities and counties could raise under the 
statutory maximum mill levies. A Board member later 
testified before a Congressional committee investigating 
Montana's assessment procedures that the Board's and 
assessors' purpose was to alter existing statutory taxing and 
bonding limitations by making them more restrictive than 
contemplated by law. (Subcommittee on Intergovernmental 
Relations hearing, Billings, 22 August 1972) 
Even the Montana Supreme Court came to disregard the 
legislature as the proper body to set standards for assessment 
and taxation. In a 1965 decision, which extended and made 
explicit a decision issued in 1960, the court held that the 
State Board of Equalization had the constitutional authority 
to compel fractional assessment of property and that 
legislative control over the Board and assessment procedures 
was "directory" only. The court based its decision on the 
belief that the legislature and court had left the fractional 
assessment rates used by the county assessors and the Board 
unchallenged for so long that the practice had become 
acceptable. 
This decision was puzzling to many in light of the 
legislature's past attempts to end fractional assessment and 
the court's 1931 ruling (which stood until 1960) that 
fractional assessment was illegal. However, the legal 
profession's puzzlement over this decision was small 
compared to citizen bewilderment when their tax assessment 
notices arrived. Statute said that houses were assessed at 
100% of full value and taxed at 30%, but the assessors and 
the Board had arrived at an agreement that 40% of 95% of 
the house's market value determined the house's assessed 
value, to which was applied the statutory tax rate of 30% and 
the mill levy. By law, a house valued at $10,000 should pay 
$600 ifthe local mill levy was 200 ($10,000 x 30%x 200 mills), 
but it actually paid only $228 ($10,000 x 95% x 40% x 30% x 
200 mills). Most taxpayers assumed they had received a "tax 
break" and left well enough alone, not realizing that 
everyone was getting the same "break" and higher mills were 
being levied to compensate. Had the taxpayer wished to 
pursue the matter, he would have had difficulty. The rules of 
assessment were not printed in any public document and 
assessors were often reluctant to tell citizens the formula that 
was used. One legislator reported that the State Board of 
Equalization refused to tell even him what fractional 
assessments were used! 
Clearly, administrative discretion was almost unbounded 
at this point. Citizens had superficial safeguards: they could 
appeal their assessments through a procedure established by 
statute. But they were not allowed to know the standards and 
procedure used to determine the assessments. Such 
safeguards were not, in fact, any safeguard at all. 
Prodded by legislative outcry over this secrecy and 
assured of judicial sanction for fractional assessment, the 
Board did begin to publish its rules in the early 1960's and to 
require that assessors follow them. While this was in one 
sense a step toward structuring assessors' discretion, the 
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rules were in direct conflict with statute. Section 84-401 still 
required all property to be assessed at 100% of full cash 
value, while a Board rule published in 1962 directed 
assessors to value agricultural land on its productive 
capacity rather than its full cash value and a 1963 rule 
ordered assessors to value all residential property at 40% of 
full value. The 1962 rule lowered the taxable value of 
agricultural land to 6% of market value, since productive 
capacity averaged 20% of market value. Residential 
property's taxable value under the Board's rule was 12% 
( 40% x 30%). The legislature had established the same tax for 
both types of property, but the Board's rules had effectively 
doubled the burden on residential property compared to 
agricultural land. 
When 26 assessors refused to follow the 1962 rule, the 
Board brought an original proceeding in the Supreme Court 
to force its use. The court held the rule invalid because the 
Board had not held public hearings prior to its issue as 
section 84-710 required, but the court did not question the 
Board's authority to make such a rule directly conflicting 
with statute. It is noteworthy that the Board's legislative 
grant of authority to make substantive rules read: the Board 
"may prescribe rules and regulations, not in conflict with the 
constitution and laws of Montana ... "(emphasis added). 
(84-708) 
One observer commented forcefully on this "odd species 
of administrative rule-making" in 1973: 
The State Board of Equalization, by its alteration and disregard of the 
legislature's statutory tax and spending policy, considers its legislative 
rule-making power to be superior to that of the legislative branch of 
government. Through the 40% rule the State Board has denominated 
itself a "fourth branch" of state government. 
(Sullivan, "Real Property Assessment in Montana," 34 Montana Law 
Review 305) 
So the matter stood in 1972 when the Constitutional 
Convention met. The assessed value of agricultural land had 
dropped 27% between 1925 and 1970, although real estate 
sales showed a 300% increase. Residential property was 
valued as low as 12% of market value in some counties and as 
high as 32% in others. The Convention's Committee on 
Revenue and Finance was, however, determined that this 
situation should not continue. Its report asserted that: 
The details of any tax administration system should be left to the 
legislature, which is best qualified to develop the most efficient, 
modern and fair system necessary for the needs of the day. Tax 
administration should be established by the legislature and ad-
ministered by the executive branch of government, not by a 
constitutional board which is immune from control by the people. A 
constitutionally enshrined board is less answerable for its activities and 
is freer to ignore the mandates and directives of the legislative 
assembly. 
The Convention concurred. The new constitution omitted 
any mention of the State Board of Equalization. Instead, 
article VIII, section 3 provides "The state shall appraise, 
assess, and equalize the valuation of all property which is to 
be taxed in the manner provided by law." Section 4 
reinforces the state's control by requiring that "All taxing 
jurisdictions shall use the assessed valuation of property 
established by the state." The next legislature implemented 
these provisions by designating the assessors as "agents of 
the department of revenue" and stating that "The depart-
ment of revenue shall have full charge of assessing all 
property subject to taxation and equalizing values ... "(84-
402) 
The new constitution at last resolved the basic problem of 
property tax assessment administration: assessors, while still 
elected, are now agents of the state and must follow 
assessment procedures set by the Department of Revenue. 
Instead of a three-member Board with a small staff 
overseeing assessors' decisions, the Department of Revenue 
can use its large trained staff to assist and supervise local 
assessors. 
The legislature was finally in a position to control the 
standard of assessment as well as the tax rate. The 1973 
legislature did not, however, rise to the challenge. Fearing to 
do "too much too fast," the legislature gave the Department 
of Revenue the power in statute which the former State 
Board of Equalization had by constitutional amendment 
(Article XII, Section 15). This was the section upon which 
the Supreme Court based its argument that the Board had 
the power to establish fractional assessments. A bill to 
require that "all taxable property must be assessed at its full 
cash value and not at any percentage thereof' did not get out 
of committee. 
The Department of Revenue was, understandably, 
reluctant to take the giant step of raising all assessments to 
full cash value without a clear legislative mandate. The 
passage of the 1973 act seemed to be a mandate for quite the 
opposite-continued fractional assessment. In late 1972 and 
early 1973, the Department promulgated over 50 pages of 
rules in the newly-established Montana Administrative 
Code, containing the written and unwritten rules the Board 
of Equalization had used. These rules were all based on a 
fractional assessment of full cash value. 
The legislature itselfadopted some of the Board's rules of 
fractional assessment, enacting them into statute. The 1973 
session amended 84-401 to read "All taxable property must 
be assessed at its full cash value except the assessment of 
agricultural land shall be based upon the productive capacity 
of the land when valued for agricultural purposes ... " 
Supporters argued that the reduced tax rate the Board had 
granted agricultural land might help conserve it. Two years 
later, the legislature further amended the section by enacting 
the Bo_ard's 40% rule: "All taxable real property must be 
assessed at 20% of its full cash value ... "The Department of 
Revenue had requested the amendment because one large 
county refused to recognize the Department's rule that real 
property must be assessed at 40% of its full cash value and 
taxed at 30%, which was to its taxpayers' definite advantage 
in school equalization funding. 
By passing these amendments, the legislature at last 
formally recognized in statute fractional assessment. The 
amendments increased legislative control in that both the 
standard of assessment and the tax rate were set in statute. 
However, personal property continued in its legal limbo. No 
standard for its assessment was set in statute, but 
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Department rules required assessment at various fractional 
rates. 
A legislative subcommittee, appointed in 1975 to consider 
the equity of the various tax rates contained in the property 
tax classification system, discovered that the recent 
amendments had done little to end the confusion surroun-
ding property tax assessment. After studying the 
Department's rules for several months, the subcommittee 
found that 23 different tax rates were being applied to 
property, instead of the 11 established by law. Members 
concluded that the question of equity could not even be 
approached until 1) the legislature knew what the effective 
rate of tax (as modified by Department rules) was for each 
type of property and 2) the legislature controlled both the 
assessment rate and the tax rate. Members further concluded 
that the standards of assessment and the procedures for 
taxation must be simplified so that both legislators and 
citizens would easily understand the basis of taxation when 
they began discussing the difficult question of equity among 
the classes. 
With these objectives in mind, the subcommittee 
recommended changes in both the standard of assessment 
and the tax rates. It substituted "market value"for "full cash 
value" as the standard for assessing since market value "is 
one of the few concepts of value with a concrete meaning, 
understood by all persons who buy and sell goods." The 
subcommittee's bill removed property that is rarely sold 
from this requireme'nt and provided an alternate, well-
defined standard of assessment for each case. Hoping to end 
the days of fractional assessment forever, the subcommittee 
clearly defined market value and included in its bill the 
provision that "the Department of Revenue or its agents may 
not adopt a lower or different standard of value from market 
value (except as expressly exempted) in making the official 
assessment and appraisal of the value of property ... "(84-
401 ). The bill then dropped the tax rates for property to the 
effective rates the Department was setting through its rules. 
Thus, a car, which under the existing system was assessed (by 
rule) at 66 2/3% of market value and taxed at 20% (statute), 
had an effective tax rate of 13.3%. The subcommittee's bill 
raised the assessment level to 100% of market value and set 
the tax rate at 13.3%. The bill's intent was to keep the tax rate 
the same for all types of property as it had been under the 
then-existing rules. 
The Department of Revenue firmly supported the bill 
during the session, seeking law that would end its anomalous 
position by giving legislative mandate to raise assessments to 
full value. The bill passed the House 94 to 1 and the Senate 47 
to 0. The Department is revising its administrative rules and 
valuation schedules to comply with this new law. The 
legislature's Revenue Oversight Committee has reviewed 
most of these rules to determine whether they are consistent 
with legislative intent. Committee members are currently 
studying the equity of the tax rates set in the property tax 
classification system, confident that they understand the 
effective rates of taxation and control them. 
Thus, for the third time, the legislature has changed 
statute to reflect administrative practice. As a study of 
"realities about the administration of government 
programs," the history of property tax assessment may be 
rare in having statute flow from administrative policy-
making rather than legislative policy-making direct ad-
ministrative procedures. However, all government programs 
involve a mixture of statute, rule, and discretion. If 
programs are to meet changing conditions, statutes must be 
changed as administrator's find new circumstances and 
legislators formulate new policy. Citizens' needs for open, 
predictable, and useful law can be met when legislators 
exercise control over agencies by carefully structuring 
administrative responsibility and by reviewing agency rules 
and agencies, in their turn, inform legislators of changing 
circumstances and gaps between theory and practice. 
In the case of property tax assessment, legislators-
frustrated by trying to change tax policy when they didn't 
have control over the most basic element (assessment), but 
mindful of the profound economic effect of requiring 
assessors to meet the letter of the law after nearly a century of 
fractional assessment-had to recognize that two steps were 
necessary before the situation could be resolved. The 
structure of tax administration had to be changed so that 
assessors and the Department were obligated to follow 
legislative decision and, secondly, the legislature had to 
enact into law what assessors were actually doing. This gave 
the legislature control over property tax assessment and 
procedure without risking citizens' need for continuing, 
predictable tax policy. In essence, the legislature had to 
compromise with the existing practice before it could gain 
the control necessary to structure assessors' discretion. 
Now, it appears that the correct mixture of statute, rule, 
and discretion exists in the property tax assessment 
program. The legislature has established clear standards of 
assessment. The Department of Revenue has the authority 
to adopt substantive rules, detailing the best methods of 
assessment. Assessors may use their judgement within these 
standards and rules to value individual property. If the rules 
are inadequate to value certain property, assessors can 
report this to the Department. The Department can request 
legislation if a gap between statute and reality develops. The 
legislature, in its turn, can review the Department's rules, 
evaluate its administration of the statutes, and seek its 
I 
advice. This system seems to incorporate the necessary 
checks on power while offering a chance for growth in the 
law to meet changing circumstances. 
However, active cooperation and vigilance by each branch 
of government is still necessary. Montana has a century-long 
history of conflict between statute and administrative 
practice in property tax assessment. Whether the recent 
changes, designed to structure the discretion exercised by the 
Department of Revenue and the county assessors, are 
sufficient to prolong the past year's harmony between statute 
and rule into a new century remains to be seen. 
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